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 UNWRAPPING THE BOX THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES  
HAVE GOTTEN THEMSELVES INTO:  
INTERNAL CONFRONTATIONS OVER CONFRONTING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
 
by 
 
Paul F. Rothstein1 
 
 
 
“The Court has . . .boxed itself into a choice of evils: render the Confrontation Clause 
pro-forma or construe it so that its dictates are unworkable.” 
   
     --- Justice Anthony Kennedy,  
    vehemently dissenting in Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) 
 
Introduction 
 
 Williams v. Illinois2, handed down in 2012, is the latest in a new and 
revolutionary line of U.S. Supreme Court cases beginning with the 2004 decision of 
Crawford v. Washington3 which radically altered the Court's former approach to the 
Constitutional Confrontation Clause. That clause generally requires persons who make 
written or oral statements outside the trial, that may constitute evidence against a criminal 
defendant, to take the witness stand for cross-examination rather than those statements 
1  Professor of Evidence Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Rothstein teaches 
Evidence,  Advanced Evidence, and other judicial-process and constitutional subjects. He is the 
author or co-author of numerous articles and five books, including the recent books FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE (3d Ed. 2014-15, Thomson-Reuters-West Co.), FEDERAL 
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES (2d Ed. 2014-15, Thomson-Reuters-West Co.) (with Susan 
Crump), EVIDENCE: CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS (4th Ed. 2013, LexisNexis Co.) 
(with Myrna Raeder and David Crump) and EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL (6th Ed., 2012, West 
Academics) (also with Myrna Raeder and David Crump). 
 This paper was prepared for the conference honoring the great Evidence scholar and 
professor, Andrew Taslitz, held at Howard University Law School on September 19, 2014. The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, treated infra, 
dealing with expert evidence under the U.S. Constitutional Confrontation Clause, are a central 
focus of this paper. They are particularly appropriate to this conference in view of Professor 
Taslitz's abiding interest in and superb contributions to legal scholarship concerning expert 
testimony and the Confrontation Clause.  See, e.g., Taslitz, Catharsis, The Confrontation Clause, 
and Expert Testimony, 22 Cap. U. L. Rev. 103 (1993). 
 The previous writings of many scholars, especially a number who are participants in this 
conference and symposium, have contributed enormously to my thinking about the Confrontation 
Clause. I wish to express my supreme gratitude to them and especially to Profs. Taslitz and 
Myrna Raeder who are here in spirit only. Of course any errors in this article are my own. 
 
2 130 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
3 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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being presented at the trial only by the writing or by another person who heard the 
statement.  
 
 Previous to Crawford, under Ohio v. Roberts,4 decided in 1980, the Court did not 
apply the requirement to statements made outside the trial if they were considered 
reliable. They were considered reliable only if they fit a traditional “firmly  rooted” 
hearsay exception or were otherwise deemed reliable on the facts. But Crawford 
overruled Roberts. Crawford held that reliability is too subjective and flexible a concept, 
and that the Confrontation Clause by its terms does not command merely that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be determined in a particular way--by live cross examination. 
Thus Crawford decreed that henceforth, oral or written statements made outside of the 
trial that are  “testimonial” cannot be admitted into evidence against the criminal 
defendant unless defendant has an opportunity to cross examine the maker at the trial or  
(if the maker is unavailable then) there was a sufficient earlier opportunity for cross 
examination. “Testimonial” generally speaking seemed to mean statements intended or 
understood to potentially supply evidence (perhaps only if the statement is acquired by 
agents of the state in a somewhat formal or solemn setting). 
 
 In Williams, the latest case, it has become apparent that many of the Justices on 
the Supreme Court are unwilling to continue embracing the logical consequences of 
Crawford, at least  insofar as those consequences require the attendance at trial of 
laboratory analysts who performed forensic tests and wrote reports embodying the test 
results. Requiring their attendance essentially would outlaw the tradition of allowing the 
reports alone to stand as evidence in cases where they report, for example, DNA profiles 
or the concentration of narcotics or alcohol in a blood or other sample. These Justices 
apparently feel that applying the plain meaning of Crawford to this kind of case would 
entail undue expense and administrative dislocation in a large variety of forensic 
situations--virtually everything the "CSI" labs do—especially if analysts from every step 
of every process might have to come to court. 
 
 The Williams decision, therefore, invokes several subterfuges to escape that 
result. Most problematically, it suggests that a surrogate witness, in the form of an 
independent expert who had nothing to do with the test, could satisfy the requirement of 
on-the-stand testimony. Under this stratagem, personnel who performed the test and/or 
wrote the report would be excused from testifying. But in order to reach this result 
without overruling the new Confrontation jurisprudence spawned by Crawford, these 
Justices in Williams had to engage in enormous feats of doctrinal legerdemain. In fact, the 
Justices in Williams could not agree on any single rationale, and there was no majority on 
any line of reasoning or any theory of the Confrontation Clause.   
 
 One is led to suspect that a majority of Justices on the Court may be looking for a 
way--any way at all, whether sensible or not--to escape what they regard as the rigid box 
the Court has gotten itself into with Crawford. It may even be that Crawford will 
eventually face overruling either directly or sub silentio. 
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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Crawford Overrules Roberts 
  
 Ohio v. Roberts5 governed  Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for twenty-four 
years, between 1980 and 2004, when Crawford v. Washington6 was handed down. 
 
 Roberts involved evidence offered at a defendant’s state criminal trial for forgery 
and stolen credit card possession. That evidence consisted of a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who did not appear at the trial. For our 
purposes, the significant holding of Roberts, as perfected by its progeny7, was that, to be 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay statements—as this evidence was—
must fit within a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception or be otherwise deemed reliable on 
the facts, unless the maker of the statement appears for cross examination. The actual 
result in Roberts was that the evidence used against defendant was held violative of his 
Confrontation right, and his conviction was reversed. 
 
 Twenty-four years later, Crawford came along. In Crawford, Mrs. Crawford was 
questioned and tape recorded by police in an inquiry into a stabbing of a third party her 
husband was being charged with. She had been present before, during, and after the 
stabbing. Her taped statement inferentially undercut somewhat the husband’s defense of 
self defense. Marital privilege kept her off the stand at her husband’s state criminal trial 
for the stabbing, so the prosecution introduced the tape-recording which was unprivileged 
under state law. The hearsay rule was surmounted because this out-of-court statement of 
hers was offered and received as a declaration against penal interest since it also 
somewhat implicated her. The husband was convicted. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed 
and remanded the conviction on grounds that the admittance of the  wife’s statement 
violated his Confrontation Clause rights. In the course of so doing, the Court gave birth to 
a radically new approach to the Confrontation Clause.   
 
 In an opinion for the Court written by Justice Scalia, Crawford  overruled 
Roberts, drastically altering the application of the Confrontation Clause to out-of-court 
hearsay statements offered against the criminal defendant where the declarant does not 
testify and the statement is offered for its truth, as here. The Confrontation Clause under 
Crawford no longer parallels the hearsay rule and its exceptions (nor allows hearsay just 
because it is found reliable) as was the approach under Roberts. Instead, the Court in 
Crawford  identifies a class of “testimonial’’ out-of-court statements that (according to 
Scalia) were specially suspect historically in England in the days leading up to the 
adoption of the U.S. Confrontation Clause. This suspect class included the un-confronted 
statements taken, and later used at trial, by prosecutors in the Sir Walter Raleigh case.8  
5 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
6 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
7 E.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
8 Raleigh was convicted of treason against the King based on an out-of-court affidavit by 
Lord Cobham given to authorities, implicating Raleigh. Cobham later said he would have 
repudiated it had he been called as a  witness. This is the  evidence the Supreme Court in 
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That suspect class would ordinarily contain (according to Crawford)  officially garnered 
statements like grand jury statements, affidavits, recorded testimony at other trials or 
proceedings, and statements taken by police in investigations, among others.  The Court’s 
holding in Crawford is that even if these testimonial statements come within a hearsay 
exception or are otherwise deemed reliable, they are inadmissible unless the declarant can 
currently be cross examined, or is unavailable and there has been an earlier opportunity to 
cross-examine her. 9 
 
The Court in Crawford  leaves somewhat fuzzy exactly what “testimonial’’ means 
in the Confrontation context, expressly postponing a more complete definition to another 
day. But there is some language in the opinion shedding a modicum of light on the 
concept. “Testimonial’’ as Crawford intended it seems to have something to do with 
whether government was involved  in obtaining the statement--to what extent and with 
exactly what subjective or objective purpose was not completely specified—and/or with 
whether the declarant or questioner would, should, or did know at the time of the 
statement that it could be usable in a trial or official investigation.  The challenged 
evidence in Crawford itself had a variety of both characteristics — it was garnered from 
the wife by police questioning and she knew that the information was related to an 
investigation into her husband’s killing of another, which she witnessed, though perhaps 
she did not realize that her statement would be evidence against her husband. (It turned 
out that circumstantially it undercut somewhat her husband’s defense of self-defense.) 
Because of these characteristics, it was pretty clearly “testimonial,’’ on almost any notion 
of the concept suggested by Crawford. The court hints without clearly holding, that 
statements made under a formal police procedure like this may be testimonial per se, 
perhaps in a special class comprised of this and other formalized material like affidavits 
and depositions. In this special category, there might be no necessity to inquire into 
intention or knowledge as may be necessary with other out-of-court statements.  
 
Crawford refers to. The Court fails to include in its analysis, another piece of hearsay used 
against Raleigh than Lord Cobham’s government garnered statement.  This other piece was a 
vague out-of-court statement, perhaps based on nothing but blatant opinion and speculation, 
which statement was made by a random boatman in Spain to an private English traveler, who also 
little connection with the events other than to be called as a witness against Raleigh to recount the 
boatman’s statement. The boatman’s statement was that the boatman thought the English King 
would never be crowned if Raleigh had anything to do with it. Would the reforms that ultimately 
led to the confrontation clause  be concerned with this evidence, too, as well a Lord Cobham’s 
government garnered statement against Raleigh that is mentioned as fundamental to those 
concerns in Crawford? This rank hearsay of the boatman would not seem to fit into the outlawed 
“testimonial” category outlined in Crawford, let alone any hearsay exception.  
 
9 As case-law develops under Crawford, issues will surface concerning what kind of 
former opportunity to cross-examine is sufficient for these purposes. Will there be a “similar 
motive” requirement as there is under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) (the former testimony hearsay 
exception) and will it be defined the same way? Will there be a same-party or  similar-party 
requirement? 
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In summary, the factors significant to determining the testimoniality of a 
statement under Crawford arguably may be (1) intent/knowledge/purpose (subjective or 
objective?10 by maker? receiver? both?11), (2) perhaps government involvement, (3) 
perhaps a degree of formality/solemnity/structure to the proceeding,12 and (4) perhaps 
that the statement was made under some form of questioning or interrogation.13 Mrs. 
Crawford’s statement  qualified under all of them.14 
 
According to Crawford,  even statements falling within firmly rooted hearsay 
exceptions are no longer free from a Confrontation Clause challenge just because they fit 
the exception. Rather, they, like all out-of-court statements, must be analyzed 
individually on the particular facts of the case to determine whether they are testimonial. 
While certain language in the opinion suggests  that some categories of hearsay 
ordinarily are not testimonial, e.g., business records and coconspirator statements, even 
those categories may sometimes contain testimonial statements, depending on the 
particular facts. That would be the case if, for example, statements within those 
exceptions were made to police or other government agents for evidentiary or 
investigative purposes. Forensic lab test reports offered as business records ordinarily 
would seem to fit this description.  
 10 Justice Sotomayor's opinion for five members of the Court subsequently in Bryant 
(infra), interpreting Crawford, says the factor is objective, meaning determined based on 
reasonable appearances. But “objective” and “reasonable appearances” are vague 
terms.mReasonable appearances to whom? From what perspective? Who is the objective 
observer? With what experiences and sophistication? And it  is doubtful that Bryant means that if 
objectively viewed a statement does not appear to be for a prosecutorial, accusatory, 
incriminatory, evidential  purpose, but secretly in fact is intended for that purpose, that this would 
not be testimonial  
 
 11 Sotomayor's opinion for five members of the Court subsequently in Bryant (infra) 
interpreting Crawford,  says both must be considered, which sidesteps the question, What if they 
differ? Later in the opinion she seems to retract, saying the reason to look at the interrogator’s 
purpose is to determine the purpose of the maker of the statement. Justice Scalia in dissent reads 
the Sotomayor opinion as placing primary emphasis on the interrogator’s purpose.  Justice Scalia, 
who wrote Crawford’s majority opinion, in dissent in Bryant staates that the significant purpose 
under Crawford in that of the declarant, although he admits Crawford did not have to specifically 
decide this point. 
 Sotomayor counts a lack of ability to form any purpose, as perhaps in the case of the 
seriously injured declarant in that case, counts as a non-testimonial purpose. 
 This factor we have labeled (1) seems from the decisions to be a focus of most of the 
attention in these cases in the Supreme Court. 
 
 12 Sotomayor's opinion for five members of the Court subsequently in Bryant (infra) 
interpreting Crawford,  says this factor is only significant as one of the circumstances indicating 
that the purpose was probably to provide evidence (a testimonial purpose). 
 13 The Court in the subsequent Davis case, infra, interpreting Crawford, says 
"volunteered testimony"  can still be subject to the Confrontation Clause. 
 14 This of course sets us up for future uncertainty when a case arises that on its facts 
satisfies some but not all of the factors. There is also the question of what exactly do each of the 
factors mean. And all of them are attended by ambiguity as to degree. 
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An exception to this general principle may be Dying Declarations, that is, the 
hearsay exception for statements made by declarants in contemplation of their own 
imminent death. A footnote in the opinion notes that dying declarations seem to have 
been admitted at common law even when they were testimonial. The Court concluded the 
footnote by cautioning “We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment 
incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be 
accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” 15 
 
It can be seen from all this, that Crawford has a dimension that is unfriendly to 
the prosecution, as well as one that is prosecution-friendly. On the anti-prosecution side, 
Crawford almost completely restricts “testimonial” hearsay statements offered against the 
criminal defendant. They can no longer be rendered admissible by showing they are 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or are otherwise reliable. But, on the other hand, 
all confrontation-clause scrutiny is removed by Crawford from non-testimonial hearsay 
statements, which is a pro-prosecution effect, since formerly, pursuant to Roberts, even 
non-testimonial hearsay statements were subjected to confrontation-clause scrutiny.  
 
Crawford excoriated  Roberts for being too subjective: Roberts had many 
undefined and subjective terms like “firmly rooted’’ and “reliable.’’ Exactly how reliable 
is reliable? But the Crawford idea of “testimoniality” has also proved somewhat difficult 
and subjective to define: What statements are “testimonial’’? Can the purpose of a 
statement really be ascertained?  What if police have a different purpose in questioning 
than the declarant has in answering? What about a statement where there is a mixed 
purpose say both to resolve an ongoing emergency or obtain medical treatment and to get 
or supply evidence for a trial, as, for example in the case of statements to rape treatment  
nurses specially trained by law enforcement?16 Or statements made by a declarant to a 
friend with the purpose to incriminate or accuse another (perhaps even hoping it will get  
to authorities although that may not be necessary)? What about statements made before 
any crime has been committed that subsequently prove useful in a prosecution? What 
about a statement made after a crime but before there is a particular suspect? What about 
a statement made where police are gathering evidence against a particular suspect but the 
declarant is unaware he is being questioned by a police or government agent, who is 
undercover? What about volunteered statements, where there is no official questioning? 
What about statements overheard by police or eavesdropped upon by them? What about a 
statement made under excitement without direct thought of investigatory or prosecutorial 
use such as some 911 calls? What about statements made for purposes of helping police 
in an emergency--say to stop a further assault, or to obtain immediately needed medical 
help after an assault, or to help catch a criminal at large who may pose a threat to the 
public? What about statements with mixed motives, such as to a rape treatment nurse 
 15 Developing case law will eventually tell us whether there is such a  constitutional 
exception and whether it has the same contours as the dying declarations hearsay exception in 
Rule 804 (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of  Evidence, which made some changes in the exception 
from the common law. 
 16 A subsequent Supreme Court case, Davis, made relatively clear that the inquiry is into 
what is the primary purpose, at least in the ongoing emergency situation. Davis is treated infra.  
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who is both gathering evidence and providing treatment? Can children have the 
knowledge and intent to make testimonial statements? Are statements to doctors or nurses 
who may have been selected by police, but are not police, testimonial? Subsequent 
cases17 have shed some light, but not a lot, on some of these questions, but many remain 
unanswered. 
One question that Crawford would seem to answer by fairly clear implication is 
whether forensic laboratory reports prepared at the behest of the police or prosecution for 
a particular criminal case are testimonial. The logic of Crawford would seem plainly to 
indicate that if these reports are prepared for law enforcement or prosecution with the 
knowledge that they might be used against a criminal defendant, they are testimonial. 
They meet every reasonable test of testimoniality that seems to arise from Crawford. 18 
Whether the test involves intention or knowledge on the part of the police, or of the 
declarant, or both, that the report will be used prosecutorily, it seems to be satisfied, 
regardless of whether the test is subjective or objective in focus. The primary purpose -- 
indeed the only purpose—is law enforcement. Where the test is commissioned by law 
enforcement or the prosecution, in connection with a particular case, there would seem to 
be no doubt. A report of such a lab test done on defendant that tends to indicate his guilt, 
offered against the criminal defendant, is testimonial and cannot be introduced against 
him unless at least someone involved in its preparation appears for cross examination (or 
if unavailable, previously appeared for cross examination).  
 
Yet a number of the Supreme Court Justices, including some who signed onto the 
decision in Crawford, seem reluctant to countenance this result. 19 While this may be 
because of practical concerns peculiar to the area of forensic reports, it may be a sign of 
something broader.  At least some members of the Court may be starting to feel that they 
have painted themselves into a corner in Crawford, and may be looking for an escape. 
The Justices on each side of the divide are using increasingly harsh rhetoric criticizing 
those on the opposite side.  
 
The case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts20 first clearly surfaced this fault-line 
among the Justices.21  
17 E.g., Davis and Bryant, infra. 
18 Recall the factors that may be significant under Crawford enumerated above: (1) primary 
purpose/intent/knowledge (subjective or objective? by maker? receiver? both?) , (2) perhaps 
government involvement, (3) perhaps a degree of formality/solemnity/structure to the proceeding, 
and (4) perhaps whether or not the statement was made under some form of questioning or 
interrogation. Any reasonable version of all of them seems to be satisfied in the case of these 
reports. While Justice Thomas suggests (see infra) that the forensic report in Williams was not 
formal or solemn enough to be testimonial, apparently because not sworn, that seems out of 
keeping with the degree of formality or solemnity that has been required in the other cases 
discussed herein and would result in an anomaly: that sworn statements (presumably somewhat 
reliable) would be less well received than unsworn ones (presumably less reliable), and that 
admissibility could be assured merely by refraining from swearing. 
19 See concluding section of this paper. 
20 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
21 The decision was 5-4. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court strongly enforcing the 
Crawford principle and requiring the analyst behind a forensic report to testify. He was joined by 
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Melendez-Diaz was convicted in state court of drug possession. The prosecution 
introduced a state lab analyst’s certificate to the effect that material seized by police and 
connected to petitioner was cocaine. Pursuant to state law, the certificate had been sworn 
before a notary public which action licensed the certificate’s use as prima facie evidence 
of the truth of what it asserted—that the material was cocaine. The U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled the certificate “testimonial”, with the result that its admission violated the 
defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him under Crawford: The chemist 
(“analyst”) himself should have been called by the prosecution to testify, unless he was 
unavailable and there had been a previous opportunity to cross examine him (none of 
which was the case here).  
 
Consequently, Mr. Melendez-Diaz’s conviction was overturned and the case sent 
back for re-trial (this time without the evidence), where he was acquitted. According to 
unofficial reports, the result was not based on issues like those involved in the Supreme 
Court, but on doubts about whether in fact the drugs were his.22  
 
The decision presumably affects a whole range of expert and non-expert 
government and CSI-type reports, not just reports involving chemists in drug tests. 
Prosecutors became immediately concerned that cases would be dismissed unless costly 
measures were taken to augment the number of analysts employed so there would be 
enough of them to handle the lab caseload and take time away from the lab to testify.  
 
 The decision was 5-4, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority which included 
him and Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and, on a somewhat different rationale (the 
formality of the report), Thomas. Dissenting were Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, and 
Breyer. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s vituperative dissent (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and 
Justices Breyer and Alito) complained quite vehemently that the word “testimonial” does 
not appear in the constitution; rather, the phrase is “witness against.” In his opinion, this 
applies to ordinary witnesses not “neutral experts.”  
 
Justice Scalia spent most of the  majority opinion trying to rebut in strong almost 
beligerant terms the views of the dissenters. The dissenters argued that declarant, as an 
expert, was not a conventional witness who observed facts of a crime being committed, 
nor was he a witness directly accusing defendant. The information was accusatory only 
Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and, on a somewhat different rationale (the formality of the report), 
Thomas. Dissenting were Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, and Breyer.  
 The only significant Confrontation Clause case in the Court between Crawford and 
Melendez-Diaz was Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). There was remarkable agreement 
among the Justices there supporting Crawford except that in a partial concurrence and partial 
dissent, Justice Thomas focused on the formality/informality notion. While an argument can be 
made that that case was already a retreat from Crawford because it created the emergency 
exception to it, that exception is arguably fairly consistent with the rationale of Crawford.    
22 The drugs had been found in a car in which he and others, including another person who was 
more clearly involved with drugs, were riding. 
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when taken together with other evidence linking defendant to the drugs. Declarant, the 
dissent argued, was an impartial scientific expert, reporting neutral science, not prone to 
the kinds of errors that infect fact witnesses. Declarant was not recounting historical 
events.  
Justice Scalia for the majority replied that there is no rational principle and no 
authority limiting the Confrontation Clause to the kinds of conventional accusatory 
historical-event witnesses the dissent mentions. Further, Scalia noted, scientific tests can 
involve mistakes, errors, uncertainties of basis, unclarity or incompleteness of meaning, 
and fabrication, that require cross examination as much as lay evidence does.23 He cited 
recent National Academy of  Sciences findings in support: 
  
Nor is it evident that what respondent calls “neutral scientific testing” is as 
neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely 
immune from the risk of manipulation. According to a recent study conducted 
under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, “[t]he majority of 
[laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement 
agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator reports 
to the head of the agency.” National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
(Prepublication Copy Feb. 2009) (hereinafter National Academy Report). And 
“[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a 
particular question related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face 
pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.” A 
forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel 
pressure -- or have an incentive -- to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to 
the prosecution.... 
 
Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but 
the incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic 
evidence used in criminal trials.... 
 
This case is illustrative. The affidavits submitted by the analysts contained 
only the bare-bones statement that “[t]he substance was found to contain: 
Cocaine.” At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts 
performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results 
required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not 
have possessed.... 
23 The problem Justice Scalia foresees if report writers did not need to take the stand is even 
worse with non-scientific expert reports and the “soft”  sciences. See, for example, Dunlap v. 
Idaho, petition for cert. filed Aug. 7, 2014, wherein a local jail psychologist’s report was allowed 
into evidence without the psychologist appearing, that in an interview he found the demeanor of 
the murder defendant to be uncaring, callous, and smiling, when relating the crime, and therefore 
the crime was committed with the depraved mind required as an aggravating factor to allow the 
death penalty.  The question upon which cert. is being sought is whether the Confrontation Clause 
applies to the penalty phase in a capital case, a matter on which there appears to be a split of  
authority.  
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“[T]here is wide variability across forensic science disciplines with regard 
to techniques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors, 
research, general acceptability, and published material.” National Academy 
Report (also discussing problems of subjectivity, bias, and unreliability of 
common forensic tests such as latent fingerprint analysis, pattern/impression 
analysis, and toolmark and firearms analysis). 
 
To the dissent’s claim that interrogation is required for a statement to be 
testimonial, Scalia replies “[t]he Framers were no more willing to  exempt from cross-
examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to 
exempt answers to detailed interrogation.” 
 
To the dissent’s assertion that it is sufficient that the defense could call the analyst 
to the stand under the Constitution’s Compulsory Process Clause, Scalia says “The 
[defendant’s] ability to subpoena the analysts pursuant to state law or the Compulsory 
Process Clause is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation 
Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or 
simply refuses to appear....More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a 
burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those 
adverse witnesses into court.”  
 
The dissent also argued that the report here was like common law business 
records or official records. Scalia responds that it does not qualify as a traditional official 
or business record, and even if it did, the author would be subject to confrontation 
nonetheless because it was prepared for use at trial. “[A]nalysts’ certificates -- like police 
reports generated by law enforcement officials -- do not qualify as business or public 
records for precisely [this] reason. See [Federal Evidence] Rule 803(8) (defining public 
records as ‘excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and 
other law enforcement personnel’).” 
 
Perhaps the most troublesome points made by the dissent are those related to the 
burden the majority position places on prosecutors and law enforcement. The fear is that 
supplying the testimony required by the majority will be expensive and will disrupt 
laboratory work, in view of the large number of cases involved across the country, and in 
view of the large number of analysts that may be involved even in one individual report. 
24To this, Justice Scalia replies that the Confrontation Clause cannot be ignored to 
accommodate the necessities of trial and the adversary process: 
 
Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today's decision 
is that it has not done so already. Many States have already adopted the 
24 On just these practical grounds of “unworkability,” especially if all the analysts who worked on 
a particular analysis and report had to testify, the New Jersey Supreme Court has just refused to 
require any underlying witnesses and has allowed the report to be evidenced through a supervisor 
who had reviewed the report. State v. Michaels,___N.J. _____ (8/7/2014). Cf. Justice Kennedy’s 
reference to “unworkability” in the quotation opening this article.  
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constitutional rule we announce today, while many others permit the  defendant to 
assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice 
of the prosecution's intent to use a forensic analyst's report. Despite these 
widespread practices, there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has 
ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to 
insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial. 
 
Scalia  notes here that states can ease the burden and facilitate case management 
by adopting notice-and-demand statutes. These statutes require advance notice by the 
prosecution of proposed use at trial of a forensic report and require  defendants to 
promptly thereafter request the appearance of the analyst if that is what they want.  
Failure of defendant to so request waives the confrontation objection to the report.25 In 
justification Scalia notes that defendants always must raise their Confrontation Clause 
objections. Notice-and-demand procedures merely prescribe the time within which he 
must do so. States are allowed to adopt reasonable procedural rules regulating objections, 
he says. Some such statutes require good cause before the defendant’s request will be 
granted, but the Court expressed no opinion on that.  
 
Further easing the burden on prosecutors and law enforcement, in Scalia’s view, 
is the fact that the defense will frequently offer to stipulate to the nature of the substance 
in the ordinary drug case. “It is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live testimony 
whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the forensic analysis. 
Nor will defense attorneys want to antagonize the judge or jury by wasting their time 
with the appearance of a witness whose testimony defense counsel does not intend to 
rebut in any fashion.” 
 
Closely allied to the burden on law enforcement is the question of which persons 
must testify where a scientific test that is reported involved multiple analysts, perhaps 
each doing a separate phase of the work or the reporting. The Melendez-Diaz decision 
seems to proceed on the basis that there was a single analyst--the analyst who analyzed 
the substance—and that he or she is also the person who wrote the report. That is the 
person who must testify.  The decision did not specify who must testify when more than 
one person is involved in the analysis and/or report. Yet there could different tasks 
performed by different people in the analysis and reporting process.  There may be  
different people obtaining, preparing, and analyzing the evidence,  separate from the 
report writer. In many types of scientific testing there may be more than one person 
involved in the analysis itself. There may be a series of successive steps, each building on 
the last, and each performed by a separate technician. There may be a separate supervisor  
signing off on the process, or on the report. Who would be a sufficient witness? 
 
The majority indicates that the absence of some of these witnesses from the 
25 Because of this indication by the Supreme Court, the Federal Rules of  Evidence have been 
amended, effective Dec. 1, 2013, to incorporate a notice-and-demand provision into Rule 803(10) 
(hearsay exception allowing a certificate to establish the absence of a public record without the 
certifier taking the stand). See Rothstein, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE at Rule 803(10) 
(3d Ed. 2014-15, West). 
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witness stand may affect only the weight of the evidence, which the fact finder assesses, 
and not admissibility. But the decision leaves it unclear how this is to be determined. 
  
Other related practical concerns also arise under the Melendez-Diaz rule. What is 
to be done, for example, when the analyst is no longer employed by the department, 
moves away, or has died before there has been any occasion to confront? Can someone 
else interpret the report on the witness stand, or must the analysis be redone by a new 
analyst who can appear? But what if the evidence is no longer available for testing?  
 
Such scenarios are not rare. There frequently are “cold hits” years after a crime: a 
culprit is finally identified based on comparison of his DNA with a DNA analysis made 
at the time of the crime. Another scenario where the problem of the unavailable un-cross-
examinable analyst might arise is where there is a retrial a year or so after an original trial 
and the original forensic analyst who was not subject to cross-examination at the original 
trial (because under older law, that was not required) is now irretrievably gone. Or 
suppose an original autopsy was performed on a body some time ago by a medical 
examiner who is now dead or cannot be found and the body cannot be autopsied again 
because it has deteriorated. Though there is normally no statute of limitations on murder, 
this may as a practical matter impose one. 
 
It is concerns like these that may be driving some of the members of the Court to 
feel they rushed to readily into the Crawford approach, and may be driving some of them 
into a kind of retrenchment. 
 
The next case in the U.S. Supreme Court concerning forensic reports provided an 
opportunity for such retrenchment, but it didn’t quite garner enough votes to do so.  It 
posed the question, What if the witnessed offered to justify offering the report in 
evidence is, say, an expert co-worker in the lab, say even a supervisor, who can testify to 
the procedures of the lab, but had nothing to do with the particular analysis of this sample 
itself, but rather is testifying about the report compiled by the real analyst, who is not 
offered and who is not shown to be unavailable?  Would  this surrogate witness be 
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause? That would solve some of these problems, 
but seems inconsistent with what Crawford appears to demand. The case was Bullcoming 
v. New Mexico.26 
 
Mr. Bullcoming was tried and convicted in state court of driving while 
intoxicated. Principal evidence used against him was a forensic laboratory report 
certifying that his blood alcohol concentration was a number well above the threshold for 
Aggravated Driving While Intoxicated. The prosecution did not call the analyst who did 
the test and signed the certification (Caylor) but instead called another analyst (Razatos) 
from the lab, who was familiar with the lab’s testing procedures but had neither 
26 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). Concerning what Bullcoming decided and didn’t decide, see 
Coleman & Rothstein, Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns, 90 Neb. L. Rev. 502 
(2011). 
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participated in nor observed the test on Mr. Bullcoming’s blood sample. 27  
 
In a decision written by Justice Ginsbug, the Court held that using Razatos to 
testify was not sufficient under the Confrontation Clause. Caylor needed to be called. The 
majority saw this as demanded by the whole philosophy of Melendez-Diaz, perceiving no 
significant difference between that case and this. In other words, Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion gives full sway to the logical implications of Crawford.28   
 
Justice Kennedy wrote a blistering dissent in which Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Breyer and Alito joined, advocating a significant rentrenchment of Crawford, at 
least in the forensic report context. 
 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Bullcoming  suggested that even though this 
expert witness was not the way out of the box some of the Justices were beginning to feel 
Crawford had put them in, another expert, properly grounded concerning the particular 
test administered, might be. She did this by stating what Bullcoming was not holding—
that is, doors to admissibility Bullcoming was not necessarily foreclosing:  
 
 First, this is not a case in which the State suggested an alternate purpose, 
much less an alternate primary purpose, for the [Blood Alcohol Content] report. 
For example, the State has not claimed that the report was necessary to provide 
Bullcoming with medical treatment.  
  
 Second, this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, 
reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the 
scientific test at issue. The court ... recognized [the witness’] total lack of 
connection to the test at issue. 
27 Caylor was on administrative leave for some mysterious reason which Razatos could 
not illuminate, but was not shown to be uavailable. The certification, which was, arguably, 
formal, attested not only to a technical number, but to several other matters such as proper 
calibration of the equipment and handling of the sample, etc., facts which seemed to preclude one 
of the state court’s rationales for admitting the evidence, that Caylor was a mere “scrivener.” The 
Court sidesteps the question whether that would make him a mere scrivener and whether there is 
such an exception to Confrontation,  by noting  merely that more than a mere scrivening or 
copying of the blood alcohol concentration number was contained in this certification.  
 
28 In Bullcoming, Justices Thomas and Kagan concurred in the result and in Ginsburg’s opinion in 
part. Justice Thomas disagreed with that part of  Ginsburg’s opinion stressing the primary 
purpose test of testimoniality rather than his test of formality/informality; but because the report 
was in the form of a certification (i.e. was, arguably, formal), he concurred in the  result that 
Caylor had to take the witness stand. Justice Kagan disagreed with a portion of the Ginsburg 
opinion that depreciated the law enforcement burdens that would ensue from requiring the analyst 
to testify. Justice Sotomayor similarly concurred in the result and with the Ginsburg opinion 
(except for that same part) in a separate opinion pointing out what the case did not decide, leaving 
open some indirect routes for the admission of forensic report information that she suggested 
might not require the presence of the analyst (although later in Williams she did not apply this). 
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 Third, this is not a case in which an expert witness was asked for his 
independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not 
themselves admitted into evidence. See  Fed. Rule Evid. 703 (explaining that facts 
or data of a type upon which experts in the field would reasonably rely in forming 
an opinion need not be admissible in order for the expert’s opinion based on the 
facts and data to be admitted). We would face a different question if asked to 
determine the constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ 
testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted 
as evidence.  
 
 Finally, this is not a case in which the State introduced only machine-
generated results, such as a printout from a gas chromatograph. The State here 
introduced [the analyst’s] statements, which included his transcription of a blood 
alcohol concentration, apparently copied from a gas chromatograph printout, 
along with other statements about the procedures used in handling the blood 
sample. 
 
 The dissenters in Bullcoming were concerned with the burden on law 
enforcement, especially but not only if multiple analysts are involved in a test and have to 
be called to the stand. They pointed to a 71% increase in the number of subpoenas for 
New Mexico analysts’ testimony in impaired-driving cases between 2008 and 2010, as 
well as experiences in other states. The dissent portrayed the certifying analyst’s role as 
“no greater than that of anyone else in the chain of custody.”  An implicit theme of the 
dissenters, found in the other cases as well,  particularly Williams, the DNA case, is that 
making it difficult to introduce scientific reports will promote reliance on other less 
reliable evidence such as eye-witnesses.  
 
 Justice Kennedy in the dissent in Bullcoming very forcefully advocates confining 
Melendez-Diaz to its facts or perhaps overruling it, and obliquely suggests reconsidering 
Crawford as a whole.  
 
Bullcoming had little to say clarifying how it is to be determined who must testify 
if there is a chain of participants in the analysis and report. Must they all? If not, Why 
not? Which one(s) must? Justice Ginsburg for the majority speaks only of “the analyst 
who signed the certification” and seems to ignore the possibility that there might be 
others involved in the collecting, testing, analyzing, or reporting process too. There may 
be several people doing different steps of the analysis. Caylor in fact seems to have done 
most of the analysis as well as signing the certification. Caylor is who Ginsburg says 
should have testified in this case.  But the opinion’s logic might also require others where 
several are involved.  
 
Justice Sotomayor’s second (and perhaps third) undecided scenario, above, hints 
at the possibility that in proper circumstances, a single surrogate witness might do the 
trick even for a group. 
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The next forensic report case in the Supreme Court, Williams v. Illinois,29 adopts 
a version of one of Justice Sotomayor’s “hints”—that a properly grounded expert may get 
the report before the fact-finder. But oddly, she dissents in Williams.  
But more broadly, Williams demonstrates graphically that a substantial number of 
Justices are now prone to some very extreme measures to get around Crawford in this 
area, if not its outright overruling.  
 
What Happened in Williams v. Illinois? 
 
In Williams, basically, a sample of the semen from the rapist was taken from the 
victim and sent by the Illinois state police technicians to Cellmark Diagnostics, a pre-
eminent Maryland company specializing in DNA analysis. An analysis and report from 
Cellmark isolated and reported back to the police technicians a DNA profile with certain 
features. In the meantime, Mr. Williams became a suspect in the rape. A sample of Mr. 
Williams’ blood was obtained and analyzed for DNA by the Illinois state police lab, and 
an expert witness from the Illinois state police lab testified at Williams’ trial for rape that 
the two profiles matched. No one from Cellmark testified. The victim identified 
Williams. Williams was convicted in a bench trial, and ultimately appealed to the 
Supreme Court on grounds that the use made of the Cellmark report without the  state 
putting any Cellmark analyst on the stand  violated his Confrontation Clause rights.30 
 
 Justice Alito announced the judgment of the court that the analyst’s testimony was 
not required and delivered an opinion (called a “plurality opinion” because while not a 
majority owing to its somewhat controversial rationale applying but limiting Crawford, it 
got the most votes). Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer joined that opinion. Breyer 
filed a concurring opinion as well suggesting it might be time for a re-examination of 
Crawford, at least in this area. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment on a different ground, peculiar to himself.  Justice Kagan filed a strong dissent 
supporting a fulsome reading of Crawford, requiring the analyst to testify, in which 
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor joined. The tone of several of the opinions, compared 
with what is usual at the Court, suggests the Justices are almost at each other’s throats. 
 
The Plurality Opinion That the Confrontation Clause was Not Violated 
 
 A. The Cellmark Report Was Not Admitted For the Truth of the Matter Asserted 
in it. 
 
29130 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
  
30 For a debate on the issues raised by Williams published just prior to the decision, see 
Coleman & Rothstein, Williams v. Illinois and the Confrontation Clause: Does Testimony by a 
Surrogate Witness Violate the Confrontation Clause?, appearing at 
http://publicsquare.net/williams-v-illinois-and-the-confrontation-clause-part-1, and at 
Georgetown Scholarly Commons, Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, Paper 
740 (2011).] 
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 In the first part of his opinion for the plurality, Justice Alito tacitly assumes that 
the Cellmark report was testimonial and thus if it had been put forth to the fact-finder 
(here, the judge) for the purpose of establishing its truth—that the DNA it examined in 
truth had the features it reported—it could not be used in that capacity without the state 
presenting the Cellmark personnel. But he further holds that that was not the purpose for 
which it was used and understood at the trial. He  holds that  the report of the outside 
laboratory (Cellmark) as used in the Williams trial can be equated to a hypothetical set of 
facts put to the on-the-stand expert.  
 
 In other words, the testifying witness in essence answered “Yes” to the 
prosecutor’s question on direct examination which question Alito treated (and assumed 
the trier-of-fact, the judge in this case also treated) as the equivalent of this question: 
"Assuming that the profile Cellmark sent back to you at the police lab was an accurate 
representation of the DNA profile of a sample of the semen that had been deposited in the 
person of the victim, does it match the one that your state lab took from the defendant?"     
 
 Even though  the question and answer did not strictly adhere in form to this 
format, nevertheless the net effect was the same, Alito argues:  the net effect was that the 
witness’s answer was intended and understood by all to be conditional on the assumption 
that the facts in the report were true. The essential  point for Alito is that the answer did 
not claim they were true.  
 
 Justice Alito states that, since this was a bench trial without the jury, the judge can 
be presumed to understand all this—i.e., that the facts in the report were not being put 
forth as true, but merely as hypothetical assumptions only.  
 
 Understood this way, the testimony conforms, Justice Alito says, to the well- 
established common law practice, codified in Federal Rule  of Evidence 703, that 
expressly allows experts to base their testimony on an unproven assumed hypothetical 
state of facts, which may not be taken as proven by the fact-finder until there is 
independent evidence of their truth.31 Such facts, offered this way, through the testimony 
of the expert, are not offered to prove the truth of those facts, but merely as a basis for the 
expert’s testimony.  Since they are not offered for their truth, the statement in the 
Cellmark report as used in Williams cannot be testimonial under Crawford. Justice Alito 
points to a supported footnote in  Crawford that the Confrontation Clause only applies to 
statements offered for their truth.32 The on-the-stand expert has not said anything about 
whether the assumed facts are true, which is what would invoke the Confrontation Clause 
being applied to require the Cellmark analyst(s) live testimony. The report is not being 
used for the truth of the matter asserted in it. 
 
31 However a close examination of Rule 703 reveals the matter is not quite that simple. 703 
requires that such underlying facts be “reasonably” relied upon by the testifying expert, and, even 
then, allows the judge discretion to exclude mention of them if they would be too prejudicial. 
Arguably when the underlying material itself would be constitutionally inadmissible, as here, 703 
would probably result in exclusion. 
32 Footnote 9 in Crawford, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985). 
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 But, even if Justice Alito is correct in all this--that the report embodies 
hypothetical facts only not offered for their truth--it would then be up to the fact-finder to 
decide whether the assumed hypothetical facts are true before they could utilize the 
testifying  expert’s opinion as evidence of guilt. If there is no other evidence to support 
the hypothetical facts on which the testifying expert’s opinion depends, the trier-of-fact 
may not credit the on-the-stand expert’s opinion that there is a match between the DNA 
on the swab taken off the person of the victim, and the DNA in the defendant’s blood, 
since that opinion is based on hypothetical facts that have not been proven. There may 
not have been the same verdict without the expert’s testimony of a match. It is clear that 
the trier-of-fact (here, the judge) did indeed consider the match testimony in arriving at 
the verdict of guilt. 
 
 The question then comes down to this:  Was there other evidence supporting what 
was reported in the Cellmark report---that the DNA in the sample they examined had a 
certain set of features? If not, under standard evidentiary law, the expert’s testimony 
should have been stricken or disregarded and could not be considered to help establish 
guilt.  
 
 On this point, Alito says there was indeed “other” evidence to support the 
hypothetical facts. That “other” evidence was the circumstantial evidence that the police 
sent a sample swabbed from the victim to Cellmark, a DNA profile came back from 
Cellmark, and it exactly matched the defendant’s, the person the victim testifies raped 
her.  
 
 But the trouble with this is that this circumstantial evidence itself depends on the 
truth of Cellmark's implied statement that the profile they sent back to the police came 
from  the same sample the police had sent to Cellmark (or at least from some sample). 
Cellmark conceivably could have just made up the profile. This is unlikely, especially 
since it matched Williams’s and he was not yet a suspect in the rape. But the unlikelihood 
is only significant because it confirms reliability and the Confrontation Clause according 
the Crawford no longer hinges on reliability.33  
 
 Perhaps the  “knowledge-of-extraordinary-features” principle (best illustrated by 
the notorious Bridges case34) might rescue Judge Alito here. None of the opinions in 
Williams, Justice Alito’s, specifically mention this Bridges principle, but it might be 
something he was getting at without realizing it.  
 
 In Bridges, a little girl, the victim of a child molestation, showed awareness of 
some highly distinctive features of defendant’s apartment (which features were proved 
another way—say by photographs). This was offered to prove that she was at his 
apartment, which was then offered as part of the case against defendant for the 
33 But cf. some indications to the contrary in Bryant. See footnote 49, infra about certain possible 
implications of Bryant concerning a re-birth of the reliability factor. 
 
34 Notorious amongst Evidence scholars, anyway. The case is Bridges v. State, 247 Wisc. 35019 
N.W. 2d 529 (1945). 
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molestation. Her statement of the distinctive features was not considered hearsay because 
her awareness of them—their presence in her consciousness--did not depend upon her 
credibility or the truth of the matter asserted by her: The evidence would have been just 
as good had she spontaneously mentioned the features and said she imagined them and 
had never been at a place with those features. The awareness was beyond her control. 
And it would just be too coincidental to be able to make up those distinctive features 
spontaneously.  
 
 That principle if applied to the Williams case, might make the Cellmark report 
admissible not on a theory that it was offered for its truth (which is what would invoke 
the Confrontation Clause). It would just be too coincidental that Cellmark would be able 
to provide features of DNA that exactly matched Williams’ if they were not from his 
DNA, regardless of Cellmark’s honesty.  
 
 If this theory is correct, the Cellmark report would not be being offered for what 
we mean in the law by “truth of the matter it asserts”. The Cellmark report, then, would 
be admissible both under the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause. 
 
 But should this definition of “truth of the matter asserted” be accepted for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, even if accepted for hearsay purposes? I have my doubts. 
There are a number of things confrontation and cross examination could reveal even in 
these “awareness of features” cases which would justify requiring that the declarant 
appear in court.  
 
 For example, the little girl in Bridges may have been coached by police or her 
parents (even though there was evidence this was not the case; such evidence could be 
disbelieved). Similarly,  Cellmark could have been tipped off by police as to what 
features to report  in the DNA (although unlikely since it appears Williams was not yet a 
suspect—but the evidence that he was not might itself not be true). Anyway, under 
Crawford, reliability is not supposed to be the touchstone.35    
 
 A different though not very satisfying answer to the point that the hypothetical 
facts were never proven would be not that the circumstantial evidence supports the truth 
of the hypothetical facts, but that the question whether the hypothetical facts could be 
found true by the trier-of-fact was not before the Supreme Court.36 This is perhaps 
obliquely suggested in other portions of Justice Alito’s opinion. 
35 But cf. footnote 49, infra about certain possible implications of Bryant concerning a re-birth of 
the reliability factor. 
36 Normally the Supreme Court leaves it to the state court to decide the sufficiency of evidence. 
To put that question before the Court would probably require a specific claim of Due Process 
violation pinpointing the lack of evidence supporting the expert opinion. And even if that 
argument were made, there was enough other evidence of guilt in Williams to convict—e.g., the 
victim’s testimony identifying Williams as the rapist--aside from this questioned evidence about 
the expert testimony and the Cellmark report. (It is not clear, though,  that the overall sufficiency 
of other evidence of guilt--here, the victim's testimony, and a little else--would be an answer to a 
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 B. Mr. Williams Was Not A Target at the Time of the Cellmark Report. 
 
 In the second part of his opinion for the plurality, Justice Alito advances a second, 
independent reason why the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the Cellmark 
evidence in the Williams case. Relying on the confrontation clause's phrase "witness 
against the accused", Alito holds that since there was no rape suspect at the time 
Cellmark did its test and composed its report, the report itself is not testimonial, because 
it was not specifically against the accused, but rather was to find a rapist.37 
 
 This would be like a case in which a robbery has occurred adjacent to a certain 
parking lot at a certain time, and police, before they have a suspect, ask a citizen on the 
street (who observed the parking lot just before the crime), "What kind of cars were in the 
parking lot". Later the description given in that interview becomes significant when the 
police catch a suspect for the robbery, who has a car matching one of the cars described 
as being in the parking lot. At the time of the on-the-street interview, the  information 
about the cars had no specific significance, but attained significance later. Under this 
second theory of Justice Alito, the statement identifying cars in the parking lot would not 
be testimonial. Justice Alito puts the “target” theory this way: 
 
The [Confrontation] Clause refers to testimony by witnesses against an accused, 
prohibiting modern-day practices that are tantamount to the abuses that gave rise 
to the confrontation right, namely, (a) out-of-court statements having the primary 
purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct, and (b) 
formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions. 
 
His part (a) is the “target” theory and seems relatively new to these cases. It adds 
a wrinkle to the primary purpose test, which had seemed only to require contemplation of 
use proecutorily or in a legal proceeding, not necessarily against any particular 
individual.  Applying the new wrinkle here, the plurality holds that the report was not 
testimonial because Williams was not a suspect in the rape at the time it was compiled:  
 
Due Process claim that important evidence of guilt like the police lab expert’s testimony relying 
on the Cellmark report, was allowed at trial when it shouldn't have been.)  
 
37 This has echoes of, and perhaps expands, the notion of emergency in Bryant. Alito also 
notes here that DNA tests in these circumstances have the potential of exculpating perhaps more 
than inbculpating, a theory that may have expansive consequences. Under Alito's "non-target" 
rationale for the decision, the report would be admissible independently, without having to be part 
of the testifying expert witness' testimony. This is also like the non-adversarial or routine record 
doctrine that provides for an exception to the law enforcement records exclusion in the hearsay 
exception for public records in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8). See  U.S. v. Grady, 544 F.2d 
598 (2d Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1993), U.S. v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th 
Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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 The primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, was not to 
accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When the ISP lab sent the sample 
to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, 
not to obtain evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under 
suspicion at that time.38 
 
Under this “target” theory, what state of affairs at the time of the testing and 
report would make a report non-testimonial? Not actually having a suspect? Defendant 
not yet a suspect? Defendant not  suspected yet in ANY crime? Not telling the lab there is 
a suspect? (Would that only work if the laboratory was independent?) No crime yet 
committed when the test is done or the report is compiled?  
 
An example of this last kind of report might be routine factory-production-point 
recordations made of bullet lead compositions, gun barrel striations, or genetic markers of 
bio-agents, all for purposes of customer identification in case the product was ever used 
in a crime. Another more doubtful example might be routinely made and kept DNA 
profiles or fingerpints of members of the  prison population, for later use for potential 
I.D. when other crimes occur after the prisoner’s release. 
 
Is There a Theory in Williams that Commands a Majority?  
  
 Five of the nine votes on the Supreme Court are needed for a majority. Was there 
a majority behind any of the theories mentioned by various Justices in Williams as their 
own particular ratio decidendi? 
  
Theory One: When a Report is Used With an Expert as in Williams, It is Not Offered for 
the Truth of the Matter Asserted for Confrontation Purposes and is Thus Not Offered in a  
Testimonial Capacity: Only Four Votes.  
 
 Although the conviction was affirmed, only the 4 Justices in the plurality 
subscribed to the theory that the Cellmark report was not used for the truth of the matters 
asserted in it (Justices Alito, Roberts, Kennedy and Breyer) as their reason for that 
decision. There were 5 votes finding exactly the contrary: that the report was indeed used 
for the truth of the matter asserted in it even though the report was not itself technically 
introduced into evidence (the four dissenters, Justices Kagan, Scalia, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor plus Justice Thomas who concurred on a different ground).  The four votes in 
the plurality, who believed the report was not used for the truth and thus was not 
testimonial, were unable to garner a fifth vote (to get a majority) for that theory 
supporting admissibility. But they picked up Justice Thomas’ vote as a fifth vote 
supporting admissibility which Thomas cast on a different theory, that the report was not 
testimonial because of its informality, which none of the other eight Justices subscribed 
to. 
 
38 This is slightly reminiscent of the expansion of the emergency theory of Davis as expanded by 
Bryant and is an even further extension of the "criminal at large" notion of emergency. Hence, I 
have said this theory of Justice Alito's is "relatively new."  See discussion of these cases, infra. 
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Theory Two: When a Report Is Done Without a Targeted Individual it is Not Testimonial: 
Only Four Votes.    
 
This was the alternate theory of the 4-member plurality. Both Justices Thomas 
(concurring in the result) and Kagan dissenting (and the three other dissenters for whom 
Kagan wrote, Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor) expressly rejected the “targeted 
individual” requirement for testimoniality. This “targeted individual” addition to the test 
for testimoniality currently lacks a fifth vote, and so it, too, has no  majority behind it.  
 
Theory Three: A “Formal”(“Solemn”) Report is Testimonial; an “Informal” One 
 is Not: Only One Vote, But a Critical One. 
 
 Only Justice Thomas subscribed to this theory. All the other Justices vigorously 
rejected it. But because this theory produced constitutional admissibility here, it produced 
the same result as the plurality’s theories, and thus provided the necessary fifth vote for 
admittance of the evidence. In consequence, Justice Thomas and his theory may be the 
swing vote in many future cases, determining the outcome even though it is rejected by 
every other Justice. 
  
 Justice Thomas’ “Formality” or “Solemnity” theory drew a distinction between 
the report in Williams, on the one  hand, where Justice Thomas voted against 
admissibility, and, on the other hand, the reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming (both 
discussed supra), in which Thomas voted in favor of admissibility. In Melendez-Diaz, the 
report was in the form of a sworn affidavit, and Justice Thomas voted that the report was 
formal/solemn and therefore was testimonial. While the report in Bullcoming was not 
sworn, it was in the form of “certifying”—the report said the signatory affirmed the truth 
of what was reported. Justice Thomas felt this was still formal and solemn enough to 
make the report testimonial. In Williams, the report language somehow was deemed by 
Justice Thomas as less formal and solemn—that it did not say it certified or affirmed 
anything, and so it was insufficiently formal to qualify as testimonial. Contributing to this 
conclusion would also be the fact that state law established the procedures in Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming, providing for the reports’ evidentiary use if in the proper form, 
which was apparently not the case in Williams. Maybe also contributing to the 
characterization of the reports as formal/solemn or not was the fact that in Williams, as 
opposed to Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the reporting laboratory was a private lab, not 
an arm of the state. 
 
 The other Justices in Williams were quite vehement about the fact that the 
formality/solemnity theory produces anomalous results, and draws distinctions without a 
difference. (See, for example, Justice Kennedy’s disparaging reference to the “pro-
forma” option opening this article.)  The anomalous results they point to are that efforts 
to make the report more reliable, like swearing to its content, makes the report more 
likely to be rejected, under the formality/solemnity theory, and that rejection can be 
avoided simply by carefully not swearing to the report. As to distinctions without a 
difference, the other Justices have said that the distinction the theory draws between 
Bullcoming and Williams, mentioned just above, is a distinction of no substance.  
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 Theory Four: Full-blown Crawford and Melendez-Diaz—The Uncompromising 
View that Providers of Adverse Information Must Come Forward: Only Four Votes. 
  
 Justice Kagan wrote a blistering dissent in Williams, joined by Justices Scalia, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. These dissenters rejected the reasons given by the plurality 
and the reasons given by Justice Thomas, sticking to a pure Melendez-Diaz view 
requiring the appearance of the analyst responsible for a report whose contents gets 
before the factfinder regardless of how the contents of the report came before the 
factfinder (as the basis of an expert’s opinion or more directly) and regardless of whether 
the report targets an individual or not. 
 
In sum, as Supreme Court disagreements go, there is, as the title to this article 
suggests, a vigorous, if not nasty, confrontation going on among the Justices, about how 
to confront the box they have gotten into concerning the Confrontation Clause. Justice 
Alito’s plurality opinion including its two-branch reasoning was joined only by the Chief 
Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer.39 Justice Thomas concurred  in their 
conclusion that the evidence was constitutionally admissible and thus concurred in the 
judgment which upheld Williams’ conviction. But he had a different reason for the 
admissibility--the informality of the report--than the plurality, rejecting all the reasons 
given by the plurality (as well as rejecting the dissenters theory). Justice Kagan blistering 
dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, rejected the  plurality’s 
theories and Justice Thomas’s, staunchly defending pure Melendez-Diaz  and requiring 
the appearance of the analyst. Thomas’s approach, relying on formality/informality, 
rejects in no uncertain terms the dissenters entire approach.  So there is no constitutional 
theory achieving five votes, though there was a cobbling together of disparate theories 
commanding  five votes for constitutional admissibility (Thomas’ informality theory and 
the plurality’s). For this reason, a number of commentators say there is no “holding” of 
the case. 
  
 What Should  Prosecutors Do Now in Light of Williams?   
 
Let us imagine you are a prosecutor who wants to make use in court of the results 
of  a laboratory test that police commissioned in connection with a case against a 
particular suspect they had in custody.  
 
Imagine you have a results-report from the lab. You would prefer not to call to the 
stand anyone from the lab, because they have a heavy workload. You may be able to 
recruit an expert who did not actually participate in this particular testing and report done 
on the defendant.  
 
As a result of Williams, you may want to consider doing the following, at least if 
the case arises now, before any further developments in the Confrontation law: 
39 Justice Breyer, in addition to concurring with the plurality, also wrote a separate concurrence 
suggesting that the case should be set for reargument to consider how the Confrontation Clause 
applies more generally to crime laboratory reports and technicians statements in them. 
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If the trial is a jury trial, make sure the facts found in the report are presented 
clearly40 at trial in the form of a hypothetical question to the testifying expert (“...if facts 
A, B, and C are true, what would be your opinion...”). Be sure careful to have some other 
admissible evidence that those facts are indeed true.  
 
While that other evidence may be nothing more than showing that the sample was 
sent to the lab and the lab sent back a report showing a certain profile that fits with the 
case, it would be risky to go that route, owing to the uncertainty surrounding whether the 
Bridges principle applies.  
 
Ask the judge to instruct the jury that the particular facts you have used from the 
report are purely hypothetical and not at this point offered for their truth. It should 
explain they serve merely as a basis for the expert’s opinion, and that they are 
assumptions the testifying expert has made which that expert feels if true lead to the 
opinion she is giving. The instruction should go so far as to say that if the jury finds these 
facts are not proven up by other evidence, the opinion should be disregarded.41 The trial 
judge in ruling on admissibility will understand this would pick up four votes (the 
plurality) if the case got to the Supreme Court.  
 
But you need a fifth vote because there are nine Justices on the Supreme Court. 
To get a fifth vote, you will also have to make sure the report is not in some form that 
would be regarded as “formal” by Justice Thomas, because you would want to pick up 
Justice Thomas’ vote as a fifth vote for admissibility. It is the only fifth vote you could 
get, because the other Justices who might be candidates for that fifth vote (i.e., the 
dissenters in Williams) are staunchly against you.  Be sure there is no evidence that you 
did something special to make a report that normally is formal, informal, since Justice 
Thomas will be alert to whether the informality is in “bad faith”. It is unclear what kind 
of showing might demonstrate “bad faith”.  
 
If the trial is a judge-trial rather than a jury trial, the same principles apply but it 
need not be made so clear that the facts in the report are hypothetical only—the expert 
can frankly base his opinion on the report, and the judge will understand that the facts in  
the report are in the nature of a hypothetical that need to be proved. This is basically the 
Williams case. Your trial judge will realize you have garnered the four plurality votes but  
that you will still need to establish the informality of the report to pick up Justice 
Thomas’ vote. 
 
40 As discussed above, the plurality in Williams indicated that if Williams had been tried to a jury  
the Justices would be less inclined to have applied the "not-for-truth" theory because a jury might 
not understand that theory unless it were made clearer. 
41 If you have a report that was made in circumstances where the defendant was not at the time a 
“targeted individual,” none of the above may be necessary if the report is regarded as “informal”. 
In such a situation, the report itself would be directly admissible, whether or not a testifying 
expert witness used to convey it to the fact-finder. 
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 In all events, it is likely the expert witness must not be a mere conduit for the 
hearsay findings of those doing the test and making the report. This means that in 
addition to being qualified, the expert witness must have done some independent analysis 
or work of her own contributing to her  opinion, as in Williams, although the Supreme 
Court did not expressly say this. And it may increase your chances of success if your 
expert witness is the lab supervisor who had something to do with the testing and report. 
(See Justice Sotomayor’s second case scenario in Bullcoming supra.) 
If the report is at the same time both informal (so Justice Thomas would vote for 
admissibility) and  does not target an individual (so the four plurality Justices would vote 
for admissibility), the expert-witness route to admissibility of the report’s contents is not 
necessary and the report can come in directly because five Justices would vote that the 
report itself is non-testimonial in the first place (though for different reasons), and 
therefore the prosecutor does not have to resort to showing that a non-testimonial use is 
being made of it, i.e., a use that involves illuminating an expert witness’s basis rather 
than establishing the report’s truth. 
 
If the report is formal (so Justice Thomas would vote for inadmissibility), Thomas 
would join the four Williams dissenters (who felt the report information is always 
inadmissible based on a pure reading of Melendez-Diaz regardless of 
formality/informality, and regardless of whether the report is the basis of expert 
testimony, and regardless of whether it targets an individual, all of which tests they 
thought were completely bogus). In that case there is nothing you as prosecutor can do to 
get the evidence in (short of arguing the Supreme Court will change its views). The 
expert route will not get it in (because Justice Thomas and the four dissenters felt that 
route is entirely bogus) nor will arguing that it does not target an individual get it in either 
(even if it truly does not target an individual) because Justice Thomas and the four 
dissenters feel that the “targeting” test is also a bogus approach and that targeting makes 
no difference—the evidence is inadmissible regardless of targeting.  
 
Thus, if the report is formal, the evidence will be constitutionally inadmissible, 
regardless of any of these other things. So, in that particular instance (where the report is 
formal), Justice Thomas’s vote (Justice Thomas’ formality/informality test) is absolutely 
controlling.  
 
If the report is informal (as in the actual Williams case) so that Justice Thomas 
would say it is constitutionally admissible, his vote is not entirely controlling: you must 
pick up four more votes for admissibility. The four Williams dissenters in no event will 
vote for admissibility (since they take a pure Melendez-Diaz approach). So only hope to 
accomplish constitutional admissibility in this situation is to pick up (with Thomas) the 
four in the Williams plurality. 
  
But if (unlike in Williams) the report does target an individual and the expert route 
has not been used properly in the trial court (so that neither of the conditions is present 
that made the evidence in Williams admissible in the eyes of the plurality), the four 
plurality votes for admissibility drop away, Thomas stands alone for admissibility, and 
the evidence is constitutionally inadmissible. 
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This is all assuming there is  no change in the Justices thinking after Williams, 
which may or may not be a good assumption, as the next section herein demonstrates.  
 
Was the Plurality in Williams Just Looking For a Way to Overrule Melendez-Diaz 
Without Actually Doing it?   
 
Notice that the plurality in Williams are the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz (Justices 
Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, and Breyer). So in actuality, despite what they say in Williams, 
they don’t think these forensic reports violate the Confrontation Clause, even if 
introduced directly without any testifying expert, whether or not they target an individual. 
 
Suppose in Williams the facts were slightly different so that the plurality could 
invoke neither of its two rationales, i.e., the “not-for-truth” rationale and the “not-
targeted-person” rationale. It is possible the Justices in the plurality would have come up 
with yet another theory why the report did not violate the Confrontation Clause—for 
example, that Cellmark was an independent lab and was quite reliable; and/or that on the 
facts there was no realistic possibility the DNA profile that came back to the police was  
faked,  mistaken, switched, or obtained from some other sample or source of Williams’s 
DNA.  
 
In a portion of Williams these factors are mentioned by the plurality in passing as 
a kind of practical support for but not necessarily a rationale for the admissibility result 
reached. Reliability is mentioned in part of the reasoning in Bryant as well.42  
 
This would mean that in a future case, even where  the two rationales for 
admissibility given by the plurality in Williams would not apply, if the report is informal 
(thus satisfying Justice Thomas’s requirement for admissibility), and reliable in the 
fashions just mentioned, the report itself (whether targeting an individual or not) would 
be constitutionally admissible even without an expert (there being five votes for 
admissibility, four on reliability grounds, and one on the informality grounds).  
 
Where do the Justices Currently Stand on Crawford in General? 
 
Confidence in the Crawford principle seems to be in decline on the U.S. Supreme 
Court since Crawford itself. The decline seems most evident in the forensic reports cases, 
as detailed above.  
 
It may be that special law enforcement and prosecution needs in the forensic area 
mean the decline is confined to cases in that area. 
  
But I sense the decline is broader than that. I sense there is a general perception 
by a number of Justices--who may have been initially inclined to agree with Crawford--
that Crawford’s strenuous and uncompromising application would be counter-productive 
across the board, depriving prosecutors in court and police in the field of too many useful 
42 Shades of the old Roberts approach.  
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statements and options, as well as imposing undue expense and administrative burdens in 
a wide variety of areas of law enforcement.  
 
Whether Crawford will be doomed to overruling in the future,43 or eaten away at, 
is hard to say. But it probably will never be what it promised to be. 
 
 The Justices currently on the Court who joined the majority opinion by Justice 
Scalia in Crawford are Kennedy, Breyer, Thomas, and Ginsburg.44 Justices Kennedy and 
Breyer who signed on to Crawford when it was handed down, now display hostility to the 
fairly clear implications of Crawford  that the author of forensic reports must appear, 
which hostility they expressed in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams,  all supra.   
  
 Current Justices Roberts and Alito, who were not on the Court at the time of 
Crawford, expressed similar hostility in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming and Williams.  
 
 These four Justices expressed this hostitilty even though they previously appeared 
to endorse Crawford by signing on to Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) and to 
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. 1148 (2011), which seemed to accept, and were purported 
interpretations of, Crawford.  
 
 However, those two cases, Davis and Bryant, arguably themselves were 
retrenchments from Crawford, or at least Bryant may have been. Davis in 2006, only two 
years after Crawford, created an emergency exception to Crawford. 45 Bryant in 2011 
extended that emergency concept to include less immediate emergencies. 46Justice Scalia, 
43 See Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 115 
(2012). 
44 They were joined several Justices no longer on the court by the time of the forensic report 
cases, Justices Souter and Stevens. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, also no longer on the court 
for any of the cases after Crawford, concurred in the result in Crawford but did not subscribe to 
the new "testimonial" theory, voting to continue the Roberts approach but finding that it produced 
the same result--inadmissibility--on the facts of Crawford. The bottom-line result of 
inadmissibility in Crawford was 9-0 but the vote adopting its new rationale was 7-2.  
 
45 In Davis, a 911 call by a victim involved in a currently occurring domestic-violence attack was 
held non-testimonial; but a statement made to police on the scene by a victim after such an attack 
was held testimonial, where the attack was over and the perpetrator was isolated in the next room. 
Justices Scalia (delivered the opinion of the  Court, in which Jutices Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part. 
 
46 Bryant was a case in which a bullet-wounded citizen bleeding on the street made a statement to 
police. The Court extended Davis'  emergency exception to include as an emergency, the need to 
apprehend the assailant because he was at large with a gun and hypothetically presented a 
possible continuing danger to the public (although by all indicators the shooting was the result of 
a particular grievance against this particular victim only).  Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion 
for the court in which Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer and Alito joined. Justices Ginsburg and 
Scalia dissented. Jusice Thomas filed a concurrence. Justice Kagan recused herself.  
 Cf. U.S. v. Liera-Morales, ___F.3d____(9th Cir. July 21 2014)(No. 12-10548) extending 
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who had written the Court's opinion in Crawford, bitterly and witheringly dissented from 
the extension of the emergency exception in Bryant, even though he had voted for the 
exception in Davis, where he viewed the exception not as an exception to Crawford, but 
merely a refinement of Crawford's testimonial purpose requirement--that where the 
purpose is to resolve an on-going emergency, the purpose is not to gather evidence for a 
prosecution. But in Bryant he argued that the extension of this principle to a broader kind 
of emergency gutted Crawford and the meaning of emergency because almost any 
criminal situation can then be regarded as involving some kind of emergency if the 
suspected criminal is still at large. Thus, at least Bryant, if not Davis, may be seen as a 
retreat from full Crawford. 
 
 Arguably the emergency doctrine, or at least its extension, was born of a post-
Crawford disaffection (by at least some of the Justices) with unrestrained Crawford logic 
which they began to feel would unduly harm law enforcement by handicapping police 
operations in the field and by depriving prosecutors at trial of too many useful statements 
of crime witnesses and victims.  
  
 Justice Thomas who signed on to the majority opinion in Crawford with no 
express caveats also seems to  be falling away from Crawford's obvious implications, but 
he had indicated even before Crawford that he was not enthusiastic for the kind of theory 
Crawford ultimately adopted. Although he did not say so in Crawford, he had earlier 
indicated that he could subscribe only to the part that seemed to place importance on the 
formality or informality of the statement. After Crawford, his disagreement came to the 
fore in his separate partial-concurrence-partial-dissent in Davis. His version of the 
confrontation right is very narrow indeed.47 I believe his position is also attributable to 
practical law enforcement and prosecution concerns, like those which are causing other 
Justices to fall away from a fulsome reading of Crawford.  
  
 Justices Souter and Stevens, who signed on to the majority opinion in Crawford, 
have since retired and been replaced by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, who presently 
occupy their seats on the Court.  Sotomayor and Kagan are arguably staunchly behind the 
full logic of Crawford, in favor of strongly applying it to require the appearance of the 
analysts in forensic reports cases, judging by these Justices' combined strongly worded 
dissenting opinion in Williams, supra.  
  
 But on the other hand, Sotomayor authored the opinion in Bryant, the non-
forensic case extending the emergency doctrine, which may be seen as weakening 
Crawford.48 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor took pains to note the limits of the 
application of Crawford in her concurrence in Bullcoming as detailed supra. And she 
refused to subscribe (as did Justice Kagan) to a portion of the majority opinion in 
Bullcoming written by Justice Ginsburg, which portion seemed to denigrate the law 
the emergency exception to a statement of a mother to the kidnappers of her son over the 
telephone which she arranged for the police to hear. The phone call was made for the purpose of 
obtaining her son’s safe release. 
47 See supra. 
48 Justice Kagan recused herself from Bryant. She was not yet on the Court for Davis. 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                              
enforcement concerns behind the opposition to Crawford. All this may reflect some lack  
of sympathy with Crawford. But, on the other side of the coin, Justice Sotomayor voted 
to robustly apply Crawford in the subsequent Williams case (which vote she lost) and 
joined Justice Kagan's very strong dissenting opinion in that case vigorously defending 
the full sweep of Crawford, as detailed supra.  
  
 So, are there any Justices today who appear relatively uncompromisingly 
committed to Crawford's strongly stated right to confront? Yes. A dwindling few. Justice 
Scalia, the author of the Crawford decision, and Justice Ginsburg, who joined that 
opinion, remain today staunchly committed to strongly enforcing the full implications of 
Crawford, voting for requiring the declarant to take the stand in all the cases discussed in 
this article, i.e., all the significant U.S. Supreme Court Confrontation cases since and 
including Crawford (except, quite consistently with the implications of Crawford, in the 
case of the 911 call in Davis). Justice Kagan sat only on the last two cases to arise, 
Bullcoming and Williams, two of the three forensic reports cases, but she seems from her 
position in these, to stand with Scalia and Ginsburg as strong enforcers of Crawford's 
fullest implications. However, as said, she has not voted on all the cases and she rejected 
the law-enforcement-downplaying part of the Ginsburg opinion for the Court in 
Bullcoming, so we cannot be absolutely sure about Justice Kagan’s commitment to a fully 
expansive scope for Crawford.   
 
 With the caveat noted just above in this section, Justice Sotomayor's views and 
voting record appear to be somewhat similar to Justice Scalia and Ginsburg who strongly 
support full Crawford, except that, being relatively new to the Court, Sotomayor only 
voted on the last three cases (Bryant, Bullcoming, and WIlliams) and she wrote the 
opinion of the Court in Bryant extending the emergency exception, all of which makes 
her complete devotion to Crawford's fullest implications a little more difficult to call. 
However, she strongly voted to require the analyst's testimony in the two forensic cases 
that she voted on (Bullcoming and Williams), joining the strong biting opinion of Justice 
Kagan defending Crawford's full implications in Williams.  
 
 Bottom line, we currently have 2 Justices, Scalia and Ginsburg (3 if you count 
Kagan and 4 if you count Sotomayor) out of 9 for vigorous, full application of Crawford, 
whereas at the time of Crawford, 7 out of 9 voted for the Crawford revolution, which was 
phrased in rather ringing, strong, broad language. Admittedly the Court then was not 
comprised of all the same Justices as now.49 
 
49 But at least the general profile of each replacement Justice has been similar to the profile of the 
Justice they replaced.  Roberts replaced Rehnquist, who voted against the rationale of Crawford, 
which rationale Roberts seems to be trying to get around in Williams, Bryant, Bullcoming and 
Melendez-Diaz; Sotomayor replaced Souter who voted for Crawford, and Sotomayor seems 
roughly similar; Kagan replaced Stevens, who voted for Crawford and Kagan seems to be 
following suit; and Alito replaced O'Connor, who voted against the rationale of Crawford, which 
rationale Alito seems to be trying to get around in Williams, Bryant, Bullcoming and Melendez-
Diaz 
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 Among the current Justices, that leaves Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Breyer, and 
Thomas who all might vote to overrule or give a cramped reading to Crawford. 
 
 Justices Kagan and Sotomayor are in an in between camp, but leaning toward 
considerable support for giving Crawford an expansive reading, with Kagan slightly 
more inclined in that direction than Sotomayor. Sotomayor was formerly a prosecutor 
and may be a it more sympathetic to law enforcement needs.  
 
Where Might the Justices Go From Here? 
 
The Relationship of the Factors of Purpose, Government  Involvement, Formality, and 
Interrogation. 
 
 Recall again the factors which Crawford pointed to as possibly having  potential  
significance in the “testimoniality” computation: (1) primary purpose/intent/knowledge 
concerning potential legal use, (2) government involvement, (3) a degree of 
formality/solemnity/structured proceeding, and (4) maybe that the statement was made 
under some form of questioning or interrogation.50 
 
 It is at least arguable that all the cases discussed herein in the Supreme Court that 
deal with applying Crawford, including Crawford itself,  are consistent with the 
following pattern: If all four of these testimoniality factors are present on the facts, the 
statement is testimonial (and therefore ordinarily inadmissible without the maker). 51 If 
any one or more of the factors is not present, the statement is not testimonial (and 
therefore is admissible insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned).52 
50 Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Court in Bryant, supra, has some language suggesting a 
fifth factor: a return in some measure to considering reliability as a factor (like in the former 
Roberts confrontation jurisprudence) but it was only in aid of describing the purpose factor and 
the difference under that factor between statements for the purpose of resolving an emergency 
and of memorializing  evidence.  
 
51The four cases in which the statements were found testimonial and therefore constitutionally 
inadmissible are Crawford; the field investigation part of Davis; and two of the forensic reports 
cases, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. (These cases are discussed supra.) In Crawford (involving 
the wife's statement taken and tape-recorded by police), all four factors of testimoniality were 
clearly present. In Davis (as to the statement in the field investigation after the domestic violence 
was over) all four factors were arguably present, at least in some form. In Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming the forensic tests and formalized reports, embodied in an affidavit or formal 
certification, were requested by law enforcement in connection with a case pending against a 
particular defendant. Thus they clearly satisfied the government involvement, prosecutorial 
purpose, and formality factors, and, since they were requested, arguably fulfilled the questioning 
factor. 
 
52  The three cases (all discussed supra) in which the evidence has been deemed constitutionally 
admissible because non-testimonial are the 911 emergency call in Davis (arguably the only factor 
indicating testimoniality that was missing was the primary intent/knowledge-of-potential-
prosecutorial-use factor because the purpose was to resolve an emergency; and possibly also the 
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 These italics suggest one potential escape from the “box” or “corner” into which 
Kennedy and other Justices believe the Court has put or painted itself—as referenced by 
Kennedy in the quotation at the very opening of this article. The escape is this: The Court 
could adopt as a decisional rule, the principle stated in those italics. This would 
considerably narrow the reach of Crawford, without overruling Crawford. It would lessen 
its restriction on what Kennedy and other of the Justices feel is “good” evidence, and 
would ease the burdens on law enforcement that are their main concerns. It thus might 
satisfy Justice Kennedy’s yearning for a “workable” theory of the Confrontation Clause 
that is not merely “pro-forma,”  to use his words from the quotation. In fact, if one pays 
attention merely to the results of the cases, the italic “rule” is entirely consistent with 
what the Court is in fact doing.  
 
  
 There are also other ways the Justices could choose to limit the reach of Crawford 
without overruling it. For example, the purpose factor could be interpreted to mean that 
only if the sole purpose was a prosecutorial/evidentiary purpose, would a statement be 
regarded at testimonial. This would exclude from the concept of testimonial, a wide 
variety of statements, such as, among others, 911 calls with a mixed emergency and 
evidentiary or incriminatory purpose; statements about sexual or physical abuse to 
medical personnel who may or may not be nominated by police but where there is both a 
treatment motive and an accusatory or evidentiary motive, on the part of either the patient 
or the medical person; and statements describing the assailant made on the scene to police 
by someone seriously injured in a shooting while the gunman has escaped but is still at 
interrogation/questioning factor); Bryant, the case involving the bleeding victim on the street 
where the statement was deemed necessary to handle the extended emergency of finding an 
armed  criminal on the loose (where the absent factor or factors were the primary prosecutorial 
intent/knowledge/purpose factor, and arguably the formality/solemnity/structured factor); and the 
lab test report in Williams (where the four Justices in the plurality felt the 
intent/knowledge/purpose factor was not present, adopting the "target" version of that factor, and 
where Justice Thomas, the fifth vote, felt, somewhat strainedly, that the 
formality/solemnity/structured factor was not present). The questioning/interrogation factor 
probably would be deemed present where a report is asked for by enforcement authorities as in 
Williams and the other forensic reports cases so far. 
 The four factors indicating trestimoniality (prosecutorial purpose, government 
involvement, formality, and questioning) will normally go together. An officially sponsored 
session will normally mean there is some degree of formality, the government is involved, the 
purpose is evidently a law purpose, and there will be some questioning. But not inevitably so, as 
this footnote and the preceding one show. A test case of our  italicized "rule" would be how the 
Supreme Court would treat a statement by one friend to another over the back fence or in the 
workplace hallway or at the water cooler, or on the street, where the intention is purposely to 
incriminate a third party, the criminal defendant--perhaps in the thought that it might get to 
authorities. There would be no government involvement in the obtaining of the statement at the 
time, no formal, structured, solemn proceeding of any kind, and no questioning. The only one of 
the four factors of testimoniality present,  would be that of purpose/intention. Under our proposed 
"rule", the statement should not be regarded as testimonial. Yet there is a substantial chance it 
might be because the intention/purpose factor has loomed large in the cases. 
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large, that have both a resolving-emergency aspect (a health need-for-treatment 
emergency on the part of the victim, or a danger-to-public emergency because a gunman 
is still at large). 
  
 Another way to limit the potential reach of the concept of testimonial would be to 
confine the purpose factor to the purpose of the declarant, which actually makes a great 
deal of sense in view of the wording, history and purpose of the Confrontation clause. 
There are other ways that Crawford could be restricted without overruling it. 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
 It is not certain any of these “adjustments” to Crawford will be adopted as the 
way out of the perceived “box.” There may be other or more drastic measures taken. 
Even outright overruling.  
 
 While it is too early to tell with exactitude where the cases will go from here, it 
seems clear that there has been a retrenchment of sorts since the ringing rhetoric of 
Crawford and its strong promise of a relatively unqualified right to confrontation. The 
thirst for retrenchment is most evident in the forensic reports area, with the result that 
there will very likely be more retrenchment in that area, and perhaps beyond, in the near 
future.   
 
#   #   # 
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